![]() This paper studies an online sequential buy-price auction problem, where a seller has an inventory of identical products and needs to clear them through a sequence of online buy-price auctions such that the total profit is maximized by optimizing the buy price in each auction. The results contribute to the theory and application of inquiry dialogues in situations where the data are uncertain and inconsistent.īuy-price auction has been successfully used as a new channel of online sales. The approach is presented, discussed, and applied to one scenario. If not, the user is informed about the missing information and potential inconsistencies in the information as a way to provide support for continuing medical education. The approach allows the physician to suggest a hypothetical diagnosis in a patient case, which is verified through the dialogue if sufficient patient information is present. The suggested approach is implemented in a clinical decision-support system in the domain of dementia diagnosis. We also modify the framework of earlier work, so that the system is not only easier to implement but also more suitable for educational purposes. To this end, we introduce an inquiry dialogue approach based on a combination of possibilistic logic and a formal argumentation-based theory, where possibilistic logic is used to capture uncertain information, and the argumentation-based approach is used to deal with inconsistent knowledge in a distributed environment. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent framework to deal with situations involving uncertain or inconsistent information located in a distributed environment which cannot be combined into a single knowledge base. Thus, when several bidders submit last-minute bids, we show that rather than seeking to bid as late as possible, a bidder should try to be the first sniper to bid (i.e., it should “snipe before the snipers”). We show that while last-minute bidding (sniping) is an effective strategy against bidders engaging in incremental bidding (and against those with common values), in general, delaying bidding is disadvantageous even if delayed bids are sure to be received before the auction closes. Finally, we use these results to consider appropriate strategies for bidders within real world eBay auctions. Furthermore, we show through simulation that the minimum bid increment also introduces an inefficiency to the auction, whereby a bidder who enters the auction late may find that its valuation is insufficient to allow them to advance the current bid by the minimum bid increment despite them actually having the highest valuation for the item. Thus, in many cases, it is only a minority of the potential bidders that are able to submit bids and are visible in the auction bid history (despite the fact that the other hidden bidders are still effectively competing for the item). We then consider the sequential way in which bids are placed within the auction, and we show analytically that independent of assumptions regarding the bidders' valuation distribution or bidding strategy the number of visible bids placed is related to the logarithm of the number of potential bidders. We first consider the revenue of the auction, and we show analytically that when two bidders with independent private valuations use the eBay proxy bidding system there exists an optimal value for the minimum bid increment at which the auctioneer's revenue is maximized. We present a mathematical model of the eBay auction protocol and perform a detailed analysis of the effects that the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment have on the auction properties. ![]()
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